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a b s t r a c t
We present an algorithm to compute a parametric description of the totally mixed
Nash equilibria of a generic game in normal form with a fixed structure. Using this
representation, we also show an algorithm to compute polynomial inequality conditions
under which a game has themaximum possible number of this kind of equilibria. Then, we
present symbolic procedures to describe the set of isolated totally mixed Nash equilibria of
an arbitrary game and to compute, under certain general assumptions, the exact number
of these equilibria. The complexity of all these algorithms is polynomial in the number of
players, the number of each player’s strategies and the generic number of totally mixed
Nash equilibria of a game with the considered structure.
© 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Noncooperative game theory is used to model and analyze strategic interaction situations. Among its most outstanding
applications, we can mention the fundamental role this theory has played in economics (see, for example, the classical
reference book [1]). Moreover, game theory has also been applied to politics, sociology and psychology, and to biology and
evolution as well.
One of the main concepts in this theory is that of Nash equilibrium, which consists in a situation in which no player
can increase his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy. Since within this theory the players cannot communicate in
order to decide a simultaneous change of strategies, in a Nash equilibrium the game stabilizes. In [2], it is proved that any
noncooperative game in normal form has at least one Nash equilibrium. However, the proof is not constructive and does
not give any information about the existence of more than one Nash equilibrium. The question posed is how to compute
algorithmically Nash equilibria and to determine the number of them in a given game.
Nash equilibria of noncooperative games in normal form can be regarded as real solutions to systems of polynomial
equations and inequalities (see, for instance, [3, Chapter 6]). In the case of two players, each equilibrium is the solution
of a linear system of equations, and therefore, equilibria may be found exactly by using simplex type algorithms (see, for
instance, [4]); however, there is no polynomial time algorithm solving the problem (see [5]). In the general case of a game
with more than two players, the polynomials appearing are multilinear. To solve the problem of finding one equilibrium,
some numerical methods have been applied successfully (for example, some methods derived from Scarf’s algorithm, [6]).
Nevertheless, sometimes it is not sufficient to compute only one equilibrium because, depending on the problem to be
solved, not all the equilibria of a game are equally interesting and the methods developed to compute only one equilibrium
do not allow us to decide beforehand whether it fulfills some additional properties or to compare different equilibria.
A comparative study of different known methods for the computation of all the Nash equilibria of a game may be found
in [7]. In [8], a new algorithm solving this problem for generic games by means of homotopy methods is presented, but
no complexity bounds are shown (for a recent treatment of numerical methods for solving polynomial systems see the
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book [9]). Regarding implementation, the Gambit software (see [10]) provides some tools for finding Nash equilibria and
studying games. In addition, the application of symbolic algorithms solving systems of equations and inequalities over the
real numbers (see, for instance [11]) is being studied in this context, motivated by the characterization of the set of all
the Nash equilibria of a game as a semi-algebraic set (an example of this fact is the application of quantifier elimination
algorithms over the real numbers to compute approximated equilibria in [12]; see also the survey [13]). However, up until
now, no significative result had been obtained concerning the adaptation of these algorithms in order to profit from the
particular properties of the algebraic systems arising in game theory.
In this paper,we study totallymixedNash equilibria, that is to say, Nash equilibria inwhich every player allocates a positive
probability to each of his available strategies. Note that a procedure to compute these equilibria can be used as a subroutine
to compute all Nash equilibria of the game by recursing over all possible subsets of used strategies.
The aim of this paper is to design symbolic algorithms to describe the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of a game,
either in the generic parametric case or in particular cases, taking into account the multihomogeneity of the polynomials
involved in its definition. Our goal is to do so within a complexity polynomial in certain natural invariants associated to the
problem, lower than the one that could be obtained by directly applying the known general polynomial equation solving
algorithms (see, for instance, [14–22]; also [23] and the references therein).
A key ingredient to achieve the desired complexities in all the algorithms in this paper is the use of straight-line programs
(see Section 2.1) to encode the polynomials we work with. This alternative data structure, which comes from numerical
analysis, has already been applied in the polynomial equation solving framework yielding a significant reduction in the
previously known complexities (see, for instance, [16] and [20] among many other works).
Our first result presents a symbolic method to find a parametric description (a so-called geometric resolution, see
Section 2.4 for a definition) of the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game with a pre-fixed structure. This
method is based on the symbolic procedure for the computation ofmultihomogeneous resultantswith complexity polynomial
in the degree and the number of variables of the resultant described in [24] (see also this paper for previous works on
resultant computation). We summarize it as follows:
Theorem I. There is an algorithm which computes a geometric resolution of the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of a
generic game with r players having n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 pure strategies respectively, within complexity O(δ3n8(log(n) +
log(δ))r2n1 . . . nr(n3 + r2∏1≤i≤r(ni + 1))), where δ is the number of totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game with
the given structure and n =∑1≤i≤r ni.
Amore precise statement of our resultwill be given in Theorem1. Note that the complexity of the algorithm is polynomial
in the number of players, the number of each player’s pure strategies and the number of totally mixed Nash equilibria of a
generic game with the given structure. These are the invariants we mentioned above, in terms of which we will express the
complexity of all the algorithms in this paper.
There are already known probabilistic algorithms using straight-line programs that could be adapted in order to compute
a geometric resolution of the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game: for instance, the algorithm solving
parametric polynomial equation systems by means of deformation techniques given in [25], or the one developed in [26] in
the bihomogeneous setting, which takes into account the structure of the polynomial equations within a similar approach.
However, the more ad hoc procedure we present in Theorem I, based on multihomogeneous resultant computations, is
deterministic and works within the same or even better complexities.
Our following result is concerned with the characterization of games with the maximum possible finite number of
totally mixed Nash equilibria for the considered structure. The existence of such games was proved in [27]; however, no
characterization has been provided. Using the description obtained by the algorithm in Theorem 1, we give an algorithm to
compute a finite set of polynomial inequalities in the payoff values under which a game with the given pre-fixed structure
will have the maximum number of such equilibria (for a more precise statement, see Theorem 2):
Theorem II. Under the same notation as in Theorem I, there is a family of nδ + 1 polynomials with rational coefficients S0, S(h)ij ,
1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni and 1 ≤ h ≤ δ, in the payoff values of a game with r players with n1+ 1, . . . , nr + 1 pure strategies such
that for every payoff vector c satisfying the conditions
S0(c) 6= 0, S(h)ij (c) > 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, 1 ≤ h ≤ δ),
the associated game has δ totally mixed Nash equilibria. The polynomials S0 and S
(h)
ij have degrees bounded by 4δ
2n2 and can be
computed within complexity O(δ2(nδ2 + L)) from a straight-line program of length L encoding a geometric resolution of the set
of totally mixed Nash equilibria of the generic game.
A further parametrical classification of games according to their set of Nash equilibria could be achieved using the
algorithms in [28], but they rely on the more expensive Gröbner bases approach. In the same spirit, the work in [29] might
be adapted to handle this problem.
After analyzing the generic situation, we deal with particular games. In this case, we give algorithms to compute a
geometric resolution of a finite set of points including all the isolated (in the complex space) totally mixed Nash equilibria
of the game. First, in Theorem 4, we obtain a procedure to achieve this task under some genericity assumptions implying,
in particular, that the number of totally mixed Nash equilibria of the game is finite, and then we show how to compute this
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number (see Proposition 5). Finally, in Theorem 7, we consider the same problem in the general case, for which we design
a probabilistic algorithm. The output of this algorithm enables us to bound the number of isolated equilibria of the game.
This paper is organized as follows:
In Section 2, we introduce some basic notions on game theory and polynomial system solving. In Section 3, we present
algorithms for computing a geometric resolution of the totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game and for obtaining
conditions under which a game has the maximum number of these equilibria. Section 4 deals with the isolated totally
mixed Nash equilibria of particular games. In Sections 5 and 6 wemake some concluding remarks on complexity and future
implementation issues. Finally, two appendices are devoted to proving some complementary results about the algorithmic
computation of multihomogeneous resultants and upper bounds for their degrees which are used throughout the paper,
implying that the complexities of all the algorithms in thiswork are polynomial in the number of players, the number of each
player’s pure strategies and the number of totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game with the considered structure.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Basic definitions and notation
Throughout this paperQ denotes the field of rational numbers, N denotes the set of positive integers and N0 := N∪ {0}.
If K is a field, we denote an algebraic closure of K by K . As usual, the ring of polynomials in the variables x1, . . . , xn with
coefficients in K is denoted by K [x1, . . . , xn]. For a polynomial f ∈ K [x1, . . . , xn] we write deg f to refer to the total degree
of f and degxi f to refer to the degree of f in the variable xi.
For n ∈ N and an algebraically closed field k, we denote by An(k) and Pn(k) (or simply by An or Pn if the base field is
clear from the context) the n-dimensional affine space and projective space over k respectively, equipped with their Zariski
topologies. We adopt the usual notion of dimension of an algebraic variety V (see for instance [30,31]).
The algorithmswe consider in this paper are described by arithmetic networks over the base fieldQ (see [32]). The notion
of complexity of an algorithm we consider is the number of operations and comparisons over Q.
The objects we deal with are polynomials with coefficients in Q. Throughout our algorithms we represent each
polynomial either as the array of all its coefficients in a pre-fixed order of its monomials (dense form) or by a straight-line
program. Roughly speaking, a straight-line program (or slp, for short) over Q encoding a polynomial f ∈ Q[x1, . . . , xn] is
a program (an arithmetic circuit) which enables us to evaluate the polynomial f at any given point in Qn. The number of
instructions in the program is called the lengthof the slp (for a precise definitionwe refer to [33, Definition 4.2]; see also [34]).
2.2. Game theory
In this section we present some basic game theory concepts. For a more detailed account on the subject we refer the
reader to any standard game theory text such as [35].
We consider noncooperative games in normal form; that is to say, games in which there is only one time step at which
all the players move simultaneously without communicating among themselves. We will assume that there are r players in
the game having n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 different available pure strategies respectively (n1, . . . , nr ∈ N).
For i = 1, . . . , r , c(i) := (c(i)j1...jr )0≤jk≤nk is the given payoff matrix of player i, where c(i)j1...jr is the payoff to player i if, for
every 1 ≤ k ≤ r , player k chooses the strategy jk and Xi := (xi0, xi1, . . . , xini) is a vector representing a mixed strategy of
the ith player, which is a probability distribution on his set of pure strategies (that is to say, xij is the probability that the
ith player allocates to his jth pure strategy). With these notations, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r , the payoff to player i if the mixed
strategies X1, . . . , Xr are played is
pii(X1, . . . , Xr) :=
∑
0≤j1≤n1
. . .
∑
0≤jr≤nr
c(i)j1...jr x1j1 . . . xrjr .
A Nash equilibrium is a vector of mixed strategies such that no player can increase his payoff by changing unilaterally to
another strategy while the other players keep their strategies fixed; that is, a vector of mixed strategies X1, . . . , Xr satisfying
pii(X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi, Xi+1, . . . , Xr) ≥ pii(X1, . . . , Xi−1, X ′i , Xi+1, . . . , Xr) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r and every mixed strategy X ′i . A
totally mixed Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which each pure strategy is assigned a positive probability, that is,
one that satisfies xij > 0 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 0 ≤ j ≤ ni.
The totally mixed Nash equilibria of an r-person game in normal form can be regarded as real solutions to a polynomial
equation system (see, for example, [3, Sec. 6.3]). They are the real vectors (X1, . . . , Xr) with Xi := (xi0, . . . , xini) for every
1 ≤ i ≤ r satisfying:
(a) xij > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r and j = 0, . . . , ni,
(b)
∑
0≤j≤ni xij = 1 for i = 1, . . . , r ,
(c)
∑
J−i
(
c(i)j1...ji−1kji+1...jr − c(i)j1...ji−10ji+1...jr
)
x1j1 . . . xi−1ji−1xi+1ji+1 . . . xrjr = 0 for i = 1, . . . , r , k = 1, . . . , ni, where the sum
runs over all J−i := j1 . . . ji−1ji+1 . . . jr with 0 ≤ jt ≤ nt for every t 6= i.
Observe that (c) is a system of n := n1 + · · · + nr multihomogeneous polynomial equations in the r groups of variables
X1, . . . , Xr with n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 variables respectively (with degrees 1 or 0 with respect to each group) and, therefore, it
defines a (possibly empty) projective variety in Pn1(C)× · · · × Pnr (C). The projective complex solutions to the polynomial
G. Jeronimo et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 58 (2009) 1126–1141 1129
equation system (c) will be called quasi-equilibria of the game (see [7]), and those solutions not lying in any of the infinite
hyperplanes {xi0 = 0} (1 ≤ i ≤ r)will be called affine quasi-equilibria of the game.
Every quasi-equilibrium ξ := (ξ1, . . . , ξr) determines at most one totally mixed Nash equilibrium of the game: for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ r , let sξi :=
∑
0≤j≤ni ξij be the sum of the coordinates of ξi. If sξi 6= 0 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r , the unique
associated representation of ξ whose coordinates satisfy condition (b) is (ξ1/sξ1 , . . . , ξr/sξr ), and it will be a totally mixed
Nash equilibrium if and only if all its coordinates are positive real numbers.
2.3. On the number of solutions to a multihomogeneous system
Let r ∈ N. Fix positive integers n1, . . . , nr and consider r groups of variables Xj := (xj0, . . . , xj nj), j = 1, . . . , r . We say
that F ∈ K [X1, . . . , Xr ] ismultihomogeneous ofmultidegree v := (v1, . . . , vr), where (v1, . . . , vr) ∈ Nr0, if F is homogeneous
of degree vj in the group of variables Xj for every 1 ≤ j ≤ r .
Set n := ∑rj=1 nj. The classical Multihomogeneous Bézout Theorem, which follows from the intersection theory for
divisors (see for instance [30, Chapter 4]), states that the set of common zeroes (over an algebraically closed field) in
the projective variety Pn1 × · · · × Pnr of n generic multihomogeneous polynomials F1, . . . , Fn with multidegrees νi :=
(νi1, . . . , νir) for i = 1, . . . , n is a zero-dimensional variety with
Bezn1...,nr (ν1; . . . ; νn) :=
∑
(j1,...,jn)∈J
( n∏
i=1
νiji
)
(1)
points, where J := {(j1, . . . , jn) / #{k : jk = i} = ni ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r}. For alternative proofs of this result using deformation
techniques, we refer the reader to [36,37] and [26]. Note that this can also be seen as a particular case of Bernstein’s theorem
on the number of common roots of sparse systems [38].
The quantity Bezn1...,nr (ν1; . . . ; νn) is called the Bézout number of the generic multihomogeneous polynomial system.
If k1, . . . , kt are positive integers with
∑t
i=1 ki = n, Bezn1,...,nr (ν1, k1; . . . ; νt , kt) will denote the Bézout number of a
multihomogeneous system with ki polynomials of multidegree νi for every 1 ≤ i ≤ t .
The equations arising in the computation of totally mixed Nash equilibria of a game are multilinear (see the previous
section): for a game with r players with n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 pure strategies respectively, we have a system of n = ∑rj=1 nj
polynomial equations consisting of exactly ni polynomials of multidegrees equal to di := (1, . . . , 1, 0, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ (N0)r
(where the 0 lies in the ith coordinate of di) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r . The multihomogeneous Bézout number associated to this
system will be denoted by δ. In fact, for a ‘‘generic’’ game, this is the number of totally mixed Nash equilibria (see [27]).
Taking into account that dii = 0 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r , it is straightforward to see that δ equals the cardinality of the set
J0 = {(j11, . . . , jrnr ) / jik 6= i∀ 1 ≤ k ≤ ni and #{jhk / jhk = i} = ni ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r}. (2)
We are going to deal with the case in which δ > 0. This inequality can be determined by considering the set of exponents
appearing with nonzero coefficients in each of the polynomials in the system (see [39, Chapter IV, Proposition 2.3]) and in
our particular case, it is equivalent to the fact that nj ≤∑1≤k≤r, k6=j nk = n− nj for every 1 ≤ j ≤ r . From now on, we will
assume that these inequalities hold.
2.4. Geometric resolutions
Awayof representing zero-dimensional affine varietieswhich iswidely used in computer algebra nowadays is a geometric
resolution. This notion was first introduced in the works of Kronecker and König in the last years of the XIXth century
([40] and [41]) and appears in the literature under different names (rational univariate representation, shape lemma, etc.).
For a detailed historical account on its application in the algorithmic framework, we refer the reader to [21]. An efficient
polynomial algorithm using geometric resolutions and straight-line program encoding of polynomials can be found in [22]
(see also [42] for a simplified approach to this solver). Roughly speaking, a geometric resolution consists in a rational
parametrization of the variety in which the parameter values range over the set of roots of a univariate polynomial. Now,
we give the precise definition we are going to use.
Let V = {ξ (1), . . . , ξ (δ)} ⊂ An be a zero-dimensional variety defined by polynomials in K [x1, . . . , xn]. Given a separating
linear form ` = u1x1 + . . . + unxn ∈ K [x1, . . . , xn] for V (that is, a linear form ` such that `(ξ (i)) 6= `(ξ (k)) if i 6= k), the
following polynomials completely characterize the variety V :
• theminimal polynomial p :=∏1≤i≤δ(T − `(ξ (i))) ∈ K [T ] of ` over the variety V (where T is a new variable),• polynomialsw1, . . . , wn ∈ K [T ]with degwj < δ for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n satisfying
V =
{(w1
p′
(η), . . . ,
wn
p′
(η)
) ∈ K n/ η ∈ K , p(η) = 0} .
The family of univariate polynomials p, w1, . . . , wn ∈ K [T ] is called the geometric resolution of V (associated with the
linear form `).
In our particular setting of totally mixed Nash equilibria computation, we will not only deal with zero-dimensional
varieties in an affine space, but we will also consider zero-dimensional subvarieties of Pn1 × · · · × Pnr .
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Write ξ := (ξ1, . . . , ξr) with ξi := (ξi0 : . . . : ξini)(1 ≤ i ≤ r) to denote a point in Pn1 × . . . × Pnr . Assume that
V ⊂ Pn1 × · · · × Pnr is a zero-dimensional variety defined by multihomogeneous polynomials in K [X1, . . . , Xr ] such that
ξi0 6= 0(1 ≤ i ≤ r) holds for every point ξ ∈ V . Then, we may associate with V the following zero-dimensional variety in
An, where n := n1 + · · · + nr :
{(ξ ′1, . . . , ξ ′r) ∈ An/ξ ′i = (ξi1/ξi0, . . . , ξini/ξi0) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r, ξ ∈ V }.
A geometric resolution p, w11, . . . , w1n1 , . . . , wr1, . . . , wrnr ∈ K [T ] of this zero-dimensional variety will also be called a
geometric resolution of V ⊂ Pn1 × · · · × Pnr . In this case, the geometric resolution of V provides the following description of
the variety:
V = {((p′(η) : w11(η) : . . . : w1n1(η)), . . . , (p′(η) : wr1(η) : . . . : wrnr (η)))/ η ∈ K , p(η) = 0}.
3. On the totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game
This section is devoted to the study of totally mixed Nash equilibria of generic games. In order to do this, we will treat
the payoff values as parameters and compute a geometric resolution of the set of quasi-equilibria of the associated generic
game.
3.1. The set of quasi-equilibria of a generic game
Here we present an algorithm that computes a geometric resolution of the set of quasi-equilibria of a generic game with
r players with n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 pure strategies respectively, where ni ∈ N for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r .
For 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni, let A(ik) := (A(ik)j1...ji−1ji+1...jr )0≤jt≤nt be a set of new indeterminates and
F (i)k :=
∑
J−i
A(ik)J−i x1j1 . . . xi−1ji−1xi+1ji+1 . . . xrjr , (3)
where the sum runs over all J−i := j1 . . . ji−1ji+1 . . . jr with 0 ≤ jt ≤ nt for every t 6= i; that is, F (i)k is a generic multihomoge-
neous polynomial of multidegree di := (1, . . . , 1, 0, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ (N0)r (where 0 is in the ith coordinate). We also introduce
a set of new indeterminates A(0) := (A(0)0 , A(0)ij : 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni) which stand for the coefficients of a generic affine
linear form A(0)0 +
∑
1≤i≤r
1≤j≤ni
A(0)ij xij in the n = n1 + · · · + nr variables xij (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni), and we consider the
multilinear polynomial
F0 := A(0)0 x10 . . . xr0 +
∑
1≤i≤r
1≤j≤ni
A(0)ij x10 . . . xi−10xijxi+1 0 . . . xr0,
which is obtained by homogenizing the generic affine linear form with respect to each group of variables X1, . . . , Xr .
Algorithm GenericGame
Input: The number of players r and the number of pure strategies n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 to each player.
Output: A (parametric) geometric resolution {P,Wij; 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni} ⊂ Q[C (i)j1,...,jr ][T ] of the set of quasi-equilibria
of a generic game with the input structure.
Procedure:
1. Compute an slp encoding the resultantR = Res(F0, F (1)1 , . . . , F (1)n1 , . . . , F (r)1 , . . . , F (r)nr ).
2. Compute the partial derivativesR0 = ∂R/∂A(0)0 andRij = ∂R/∂A(0)ij for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni.
3. Specialize A(0)0 = T , A(0)i1 = −1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, A(0)ij = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 2 ≤ j ≤ ni, and A(ik)J−i = C (i)j1...ji−1kji+1...jr
− C (i)j1...ji−10ji+1...jr for 1 ≤ i ≤ r , 1 ≤ k ≤ ni and each J−i = j1 . . . ji−1ji+1 . . . jr in the polynomialsR,R0 andRij to
obtain P, ∂P/∂T andWij for 1 ≤ i ≤ r , 1 ≤ j ≤ ni.
Theorem 1. Algorithm GenericGame computes a geometric resolution of the set of quasi-equilibria of a generic game with r
players having n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 pure strategies respectively, within complexity O(D2(D+ n1 . . . nr δ log(D)r2n4(n3 + rN))),
where
D :=
∑
0≤i≤r
niBezn1,...,nr (d0, n0; d1, n1; . . . ; di, ni − 1; . . . ; dr , nr) (n0 := 1, d0 := (1, . . . , 1)),
δ := Bezn1,...,nr (d1, n1; . . . ; dr , nr),
n :=
∑
1≤i≤r
ni,
N :=
∏
1≤i≤r
(ni + 1)+
∑
1≤i≤r
ni(n1 + 1) . . . (ni−1 + 1)(ni+1 + 1) . . . (nr + 1).
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The algorithm obtains polynomials P(T ), Wij(T ) ∈ Q[C (i)j1...jr ][T ] giving the geometric resolution with degT P = δ, degT Wij <
δ and degrees bounded by D in the parameters C (i)j1...jr , which are encoded by a straight-line program of length O(D
2(D +
n1 . . . nr δ log(D)r2n4(n3 + rN))).
Proof. The first step of the algorithm consists in the computation of the polynomial R which is the specialization of the
resultant of a system of multihomogeneous polynomials of respective multidegrees d0 = (1, . . . , 1), d(1)j = (0, 1, . . . , 1)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n1, . . . , d(r)j = (1, . . . , 1, 0) for 1 ≤ j ≤ nr , in which all the coefficients of the polynomial of multidegree d0
corresponding to monomials not appearing in F0 are substituted for 0 (see [43, Theorem 1]). This polynomial is obtained by
applying an adapted version of the algorithm in [24, Theorem 5] (see Appendix A). The complexity of this algorithm is of
order O(D2(D+ n1 . . . nrδ log(D)r2n4(n3 + rN))) and it computes an slp forR whose length is of the same order.
The algorithm to compute a geometric resolution of the zero-dimensional variety defined by the system F (i)k = 0 (1 ≤
i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni) from R is standard: the parametrizations of the points in the variety are obtained from the partial
derivatives R0 = ∂R/∂A(0)0 and Rij = ∂R/∂A(0)ij for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni. An slp which encodes these derivatives can
be computed from the slp representingR within the same complexity order and length of the same order as the slp which
encodesR (see [33]). Note that degA(0)0
Rij < δ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni.
Let L := ∑ 1≤i≤r
1≤j≤ni
Lijxij be a generic linear form in the variables xij, where Lij are new variables, and let T be another new
variable. Let PL ∈ Q[A(ik), Lij][T ] be the polynomial obtained by specializing
A(0)0 7→ T , A(0)ij 7→ −Lijxi0 (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni) (4)
inR. SinceR ∈ (F0, F (i)k : 1 ≤ k ≤ r, 1 ≤ i ≤ nk), substituting L for T in PL, we obtain a polynomial P ∈ (F (i)k : 1 ≤ k ≤
r, 1 ≤ i ≤ nk). As degT (PL) = δ, PL must be a multiple by a nonzero factor inQ[A(ik)] of the minimal polynomial of L. On the
other hand,
∂P
∂Lij
= − ∂R
∂A(0)ij
(L,−Lij, A(ik))xi0 + ∂R
∂A(0)0
(L,−Lij, A(ik))xij
belongs to the ideal (F (i)k : 1 ≤ k ≤ r, 1 ≤ i ≤ nk). We conclude that making the substitution (4) in R0 and Rij (1 ≤
i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni), polynomials which complete the geometric resolution of the variety defined by F (i)k = 0 with respect to
the generic linear form L :=∑ 1≤i≤r
1≤j≤ni
Lijxij can be obtained.
Now, we choose a separating linear form and we substitute its coefficients for the parameters Lij. As the multihomoge-
neous system F (i)k = 0 is generic, it has no zeroes in the hyperplanes xi0 = 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ r) and we can consider its zeroes
as affine points by setting xi0 = 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ r). The linear form ` := ∑1≤i≤r xi1 separates these affine points. To see this,
choose coefficient vectors for the polynomials F (i)k so as to obtain a specific system f
(i)
k with the maximum number of affine
solutions, and take a linear form l ∈ Q[xij; 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni] separating these solutions. Now, making a linear change
of variables in each group Xi (1 ≤ i ≤ r), the linear form l maps to ` and the specific system considered leads to a system
of the same structure in the new variables having the maximum number of affine roots and that are separated by `. As ` is
a separating linear form for a specific system, it is also separating for the generic one.
Hence, specializing
A(0)0 7→ T , A(0)i1 7→ −1 (1 ≤ i ≤ r), A(0)ij 7→ 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 2 ≤ j ≤ ni)
in the polynomials R, R0 and Rij (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni), new polynomials giving a geometric resolution of the set of
common zeros of the polynomials F (i)k in P
n1 × · · · × Pnr are obtained. Finally, substituting
A(ik)J−i = C (i)j1...ji−1kji+1...jr − C (i)j1...ji−10ji+1...jr (5)
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r , 1 ≤ k ≤ ni and each J−i = j1 . . . ji−1ji+1 . . . jr with 0 ≤ jt ≤ nt for every t 6= i, the algorithm
obtains polynomials P(T ), ∂P/∂T (T ) andWij(T ) in Q[C (i)j1...jr ][T ] such that the set of quasi-equilibria of the generic game in
Pn1 × · · · × Pnr is represented as follows:{((
∂P
∂T
(t) : W11(t) : . . . : W1n1(t)
)
, . . . ,
(
∂P
∂T
(t) : Wr1(t) : . . . : Wrnr (t)
))/
t ∈ K, P(t) = 0
}
, (6)
where K := Q(C (i)j1...jr ) (note that the linear form ` still separates the quasi-equilibria of the generic game). The polynomials
P , ∂P/∂T andWij are encoded by an slp of length O(D2(D+n1 . . . nrδ log(D)r2n4(n3+rN))) overQ, which is also the order of
complexity of the whole computation. The upper bounds degT P ≤ δ and degT Wij < δ follow from the stated upper bounds
for the degrees ofR andRij in the variable A
(0)
0 . 
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3.2. Games with the maximum number of totally mixed Nash equilibria
The existence of games with the maximum possible number of totally mixed Nash equilibria, namely the
multihomogeneous Bézout number δ of the associated polynomial equation system, was proved in [27]. In this subsection,
we will give an algorithm to obtain a finite family of polynomial conditions (inequalities over the reals) ensuring that a
given game satisfying those conditions has δ totally mixed Nash equilibria. To this end, we will use signed subresultant
sequences as in [44]. We do not use the most sophisticated algorithmic version of this approach (see, for instance, [45])
because the polynomials we are working with depend on some parameters and are encoded by slp’s. So, we will use the
classical determinant-based construction of subresultants suitably adapted to our situation.
We will first recall some definitions and notation we will use (see, for example, [11, Sections 2.2.2 and 4.2.2]). For
arbitrary polynomials P,Q ∈ R[T ] with P 6= 0, the Tarski query (also known as Sturm query) of Q for P is the number
TaQ(Q , P) = #{t ∈ R : P(t) = 0, Q (t) > 0} − #{t ∈ R : P(t) = 0, Q (t) < 0} and the Cauchy index, I(Q/P) of the rational
function Q/P is, informally, the number of ‘‘jumps’’ from −∞ to +∞ minus the number of ‘‘jumps’’ from +∞ to −∞ of
the rational function Q/P . For polynomials P and Q over any field, if p > q are the degrees of P and Q respectively, then
for 0 ≤ h ≤ q, the hth Sylvester–Habitch matrix of P and Q , SyHah(P,Q ), is the (p + q − 2h) × (p + q − h)-matrix of the
polynomials T q−h−1P, . . . , P,Q , . . . , T p−h−1Q in the basis {T p+q−h−1, . . . , T , 1} and the hth signed subresultant coefficient,
sResh(P,Q ), is the determinant of the squarematrix ŜyHah(P,Q ) obtained from SyHah(P,Q ) by deleting the last h columns.
Besides, for P and Q in R[T ], sResp(P,Q ) is defined as the sign of the main coefficient in P to the (p− q)th power.
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 2. With our previous notation, there is a family of nδ + 1 polynomials S0, S(h)ij , 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, 1 ≤ h ≤ δ,
in Q[C (i)j1...jr ]1≤i≤r, 0≤jt≤nt \ {0} with total degrees bounded by 4δD, such that for every vector c := (c(i)j1...jr )1≤i≤r, 0≤jt≤nt with real
coordinates satisfying the conditions
S0(c) 6= 0, S(h)ij (c) > 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, 1 ≤ h ≤ δ),
the game with r players with n1+ 1, . . . , nr + 1 pure strategies and payoff values given by c has δ totally mixed Nash equilibria.
The polynomials S0 and S
(h)
ij can be computed within complexity O(δ
2(nδ2 + L)) from a straight-line program of length L
encoding polynomials P, Wij as in Theorem 1. The algorithm obtains straight-line programs of length O(δ2(δ2+ L))which encode
these polynomials.
Proof. Consider a specific choice of payoff values c := (c(i)j1...jr )1≤i≤r, 0≤jt≤nt over R and assume that the polynomials P(c)(T )
andWij(c)(T ) obtained from P(T ) andWij(T ) by specializing the parameters at c provide a geometric resolution of the set
of quasi-equilibria of the game with the given payoffs. Then, the totally mixed Nash equilibria of the game are those points
(ξ1, . . . , ξr) ∈ Rn1+1 × . . .× Rnr+1 of the form
ξi =
(P ′(c)(t)
Si(c)(t)
,
Wi1(c)(t)
Si(c)(t)
, . . . ,
Wi ni(c)(t)
Si(c)(t)
)
(1 ≤ i ≤ r),
where P ′ := ∂P/∂T and Si := P ′ +∑1≤j≤ni Wij, having all their coordinates real and positive; that is, with t belonging to{t ∈ R : P(c)(t) = 0, P ′(c)(t) > 0,Wij(c)(t) > 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni} or {t ∈ R : P(c)(t) = 0, P ′(c)(t) <
0, Wij(c)(t) < 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni}. Equivalently, t must belong to the intersection⋂
1≤i≤r, 1≤j≤ni
{t ∈ R : P(c)(t) = 0, (P ′(c)Wij(c))(t) > 0}.
For every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni, let G(i)k ∈ Q[C (i)j1...jr ][X1, . . . , Xr ] be the polynomial obtained from F (i)k (see (3)) by means
of the substitution stated in (5). Let us consider the resultant
S0 := Resδ,δ−1(P(T ), P ′(T )) ∈ Q[C (i)j1...jr ]
of P(T ) and P ′(T ) regarded as polynomials in the variable T with coefficients inQ[C (i)j1...jr ], where the subindices indicate the
degrees in T of P and P ′ respectively. Observe that, for every real vector c = (c(i)j1...jr )1≤i≤r, 0≤jt≤nt with S0(c) 6= 0, P(c)(T ) is a
nonzero square-free polynomial of degree δ. Furthermore, the solution set of the system G(i)k (c) = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni,
is a zero-dimensional sub-variety of Pn1 × · · · × Pnr with δ distinct points and P(c)(T ), Wij(c)(T ) (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni)
give a geometric resolution of this variety. Therefore, if the condition S0(c) 6= 0 holds, the game with payoff vector c will
have δ different totally mixed Nash equilibria if and only if, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni,
#{t ∈ R : P(c)(t) = 0, (P ′Wij(c))(t) > 0} = δ. (7)
Let us fix i and j, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni. Since the condition S0(c) 6= 0 implies that the degree of P(c) is δ, we have
that (7) is equivalent to TaQ(P ′(c)Wij(c), P(c)) = δ. By [11, Proposition 2.57], this equality is the same as I((P ′(c))2Wij(c)/
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P(c)) = δ, which is equivalent to I(Wij(c)/P(c)) = δ, since P(c) is a square-free polynomial. By [11, Remark 2.55], the
last identity implies that degT (Wij(c)) = δ − 1. Moreover, provided that this degree condition is met, by [11, Theorem
9.12], identity (7) is equivalent to the fact that there are no sign changes in the sequence sResδ(P(c),Wij(c)), sResδ−1(P(c),
Wij(c)), . . . , sRes0(P(c),Wij(c)). Thus, we define
S(h)ij = sResh(P,Wij) sResh−1(P,Wij) for 1 ≤ h ≤ δ − 1 and S(δ)ij = pδ sResδ−1(P,Wij),
where P,Wij are regarded as polynomials in the variable T with coefficients in Q[C (i)j1...jr ] and pδ is the leading coefficient
of P . Then, for every payoff vector c with S0(c) 6= 0, we have that (7) is equivalent to S(h)ij (c) > 0 for 1 ≤ h ≤ δ (since
sResδ−1(P(c),Wij(c)) equals the coefficient of degree δ − 1 of Wij(c), the condition on the degree of Wij(c) is ensured by
S(δ)ij (c) being positive).
Note that each of the polynomials S0 and sResh(P,Wij) for 0 ≤ h ≤ δ − 1 is the determinant of a matrix of size at most
2δ − 1 whose entries are polynomials in Q[C (i)j1...jr ] of total degrees bounded by D and so, their degrees are bounded by 2δD.
Therefore, the degree of S(h)ij (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, 1 ≤ h ≤ δ) is bounded by 4δD.
Finally, we detail the successive steps of the algorithm and we estimate its complexity and the length of an slp encoding
the output polynomials. First, from an slp of length L encoding P and Wij (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni), we obtain an slp of
length O(δ2L) within the same complexity for the coefficients of P , P ′ and Wij (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni) in the variable T
(see [33, Lemma 21.25]). Then, we apply the division-free algorithm described in [46] in order to compute the determinants
giving the resultant S0 and the signed subresultants required. This algorithm computes, in fact, all the coefficients of the
characteristic polynomial of a matrix and it proceeds recursively, computing at each step the characteristic polynomial of
a matrix obtained by deleting a row and a column from the matrix considered in the previous step. In our case, for every
1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, we have that for h = 1, . . . , δ−1, thematrix ŜyHah(P,Wij)may be obtained from ŜyHah−1(P,Wij) by
deleting the first and last row and the last two columns. Thus, all the signed subresultants sResh(P,Wij) (1 ≤ h ≤ δ−1) are
obtained as intermediate results in the computation of sRes0(P,Wij) by means of an adequate choice of rows and columns
during the execution of the algorithm in [46]. Therefore, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, the algorithm obtains slp’s of length
O(δ2(δ2 + L)) encoding the polynomials S(h)ij within complexity O(δ4). The computation of an slp of length O(δ2(δ2 + L))
encoding S0 is achievedwithin the same complexity order. The overall complexity of the algorithm is thenO(δ2(nδ2+L)). 
Note that, with the same notation as in the previous theorem, for a generic game with the given structure (namely, any
game whose payoff vector c satisfies S0(c) 6= 0) the conditions S(h)ij (c) > 0 are equivalent to the fact that the considered
game has the maximum possible number of totally mixed Nash equilibria.
4. The set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of an arbitrary game
When dealing with a particular game with specific payoff values, evaluating the geometric resolution of the set of quasi-
equilibria of a generic gamewith the same structure may fail to describe the quasi-equilibria of the given game. This section
is aimed at adapting the procedures previously developed in order to handle this problem.
In fact, themain idea of this section is to describe bymeans of geometric resolutions finite sets which contain the isolated
(in the complex sense) totally mixed Nash equilibria of any game. In the context of computational algebra, there are already
algorithms computing the isolated solutions for any systemof polynomial equations. The possible advantage of our approach
is that, as we take into account the multihomogeneous structure of the systems involved, as in [26], the order of complexity
of our algorithms may be lower than the known ones when the multihomogeneous bound for the number of equilibria is
small.
4.1. Games with a zero-dimensional set of quasi-equilibria
As before, consider an r-person noncooperative game in normal form in which the players have n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1
distinct available pure strategies respectively. Let c(i) := (c(i)j1...jr )0≤jk≤nk denote the payoff matrix to player i for every
1 ≤ i ≤ r . The polynomial equations defining the Nash equilibria of the game (see Section 2.2) can be obtained by
specializing the coefficients of F (i)k introduced in (3) in a
(ik) := (a(ik)j1...ji−1ji+1...jr )0≤jt≤nt defined as follows a(ik)j1...ji−1ji+1...jr :=
c(i)j1...ji−1kji+1...jr − c(i)j1...ji−10ji+1...jr . Thus, if a := (a(ik))1≤i≤r, 1≤k≤ni , the set of quasi-equilibria of the game is
Va := {ξ := (ξ1, . . . , ξr) ∈ Pn1 × · · · × Pnr /F (i)k (a, ξ) = 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni}.
Lemma 3. Under the previous notation, there exists an algorithm which decides whether Va has only finitely many points within
complexity O(D2(n1 . . . nr)2δ(D+ n1 . . . nrδ log(D)r2n4(n3 + rN))).
Proof. Consider a generic polynomial of multidegree d0 := (1, . . . , 1) in the groups of variables X1, . . . , Xr ,
F0 =
∑
1≤i≤r
0≤ji≤ni
A(0)j1...jr x1j1 . . . xrjr
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and the resultant R := Res(F0, F (1)1 , . . . , F (1)n1 , . . . , F (r)1 , . . . , F (r)nr ). Let Ra(A(0)j1...jr ) be the polynomial obtained by substituting
the coordinates of a = (a(ik))1≤i≤r, 1≤k≤ni for A(ik) in R. Then Va is either zero-dimensional or empty if and only if Ra is not
identically zero: If Va is empty, the result is straightforward. If Va is zero-dimensional, there exists a multilinear polynomial
f ∈ Q[X1, . . . , Xr ] which does not vanish at any of the (finitely many) points of Va and therefore, Ra does not vanish at the
coefficients of f . On the other hand, if Va has positive dimension, anymultilinear polynomial f has zeros in Va and, therefore,
Ra is identically zero.
The first step of the algorithm computes an slp of lengthL := O(D2(D+ n1 . . . nrδ log(D)r2n4(n3+ rN)))which encodes
themultihomogeneous resultant R by using the algorithm described in [24], adapted according to Appendix A below, within
complexity of the same order asL. The specialization to obtain Ra does not modify this complexity order.
Let f0 ∈ Q[t][X1, . . . , Xr ] be the polynomial obtained by specializing the variables A(0)j1...jr in F0 into successive powers of
a new variable t:
A(0)j1...jr = t
j1+(n1+1)j2+(n1+1)(n2+1)j3+···+(
r−1∏
j=0
(nj+1))jr
. (8)
For every ξ := (ξ1, . . . , ξr) ∈ Pn1 × · · · × Pnr , we have
f0(ξ)(t) =
∑
j1...jr
ξ1j1 . . . ξrjr t
j1+(n1+1)j2+(n1+1)(n2+1)j3+···+(
r−1∏
j=0
(nj+1))jr ∈ C[t],
which is a nonzero polynomial due to the fact that there exists at least one choice of j1, . . . , jr for which the product
ξ1j1 . . . ξrjr is not 0. Now, if Va is a finite set, let ∆(t) :=
∏
ξ∈Va f0(ξ)(t). Note that there exists t0 ∈ Q with ∆(t0) 6= 0. Then
f0(t0) ∈ Q[X1, . . . , Xr ] does not vanish at any point of Va and therefore the polynomial Ra,t ∈ Q[t] obtained by specializing
Ra following (8) does not vanish at t0. Then Ra,t is not the zero polynomial.
To decidewhether Ra ∈ Q[A(0)j1...jr ] is zero or not, it suffices to decidewhether Ra,t ∈ Q[t] is zero or not. Taking into account
that deg(Ra,t) ≤ (∏1≤i≤r(ni + 1) − 1)δ, this task can be achieved by evaluating Ra,t at (∏1≤i≤r(ni + 1))δ different values
of t , which is done by substituting the powers of these values for A(0)j1...jr as in (8) in the slp for Ra. The overall complexity of
this procedure is
(
(
∏
1≤i≤r(ni + 1))+L
)
(
∏
1≤i≤r(ni + 1))δ. 
Once we know that Va is zero-dimensional, even though the game does not have the maximum number of quasi-
equilibria, we can obtain a geometric resolution of its set of affine quasi-equilibria
V affa := {ξ ∈ Va : ξi0 6= 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r}
by means of a deterministic algorithm within a complexity polynomial in the same parameters as in the generic case.
We will use the following notation: given F ∈ Q[A(0)0 , A(0)ij ], F (t) ∈ Q[t][A(0)0 ]will denote the polynomial obtained from F
by specializing, as before, all the variables, except for A(0)0 , into successive powers of a variable t .
Algorithm AffineQuasiEquilibria
Input: A family of payoff matrices c(i) := (c(i)j1...jr )0≤jk≤nk for 1 ≤ i ≤ r defining a game with a finite number of
quasi-equilibria.
Output: A geometric resolution of the set of affine quasi-equilibria of the game.
Procedure:
1. Compute the resultant R of a family of multihomogeneous polynomials with multidegrees d0 = (1, . . . , 1), d(i)j =
(1, . . . , 0, . . . , 1) (where the 0 is in the ith coordinate) for 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ ni.
2. Compute a(ik)j1...ji−1ji+1...jr := c(i)j1...ji−1kji+1...jr − c(i)j1...ji−10ji+1...jr and set a for the vector with these entries.
3. Specialize A(ik) = a(ik) in R to obtain the polynomial Ra(A(0)j1...jr ).
4. Compute the leading coefficient of Ra in the variable A
(0)
0...0 and divide Ra by this coefficient, obtaining a polynomial
Raffa .
5. Specialize A(0)0...0 = A(0)0 , A(0)0...0 j 0...0 = A(0)ij (where the index j is in the ith place) for 1 ≤ j ≤ ni and A(0)j1...jr = 0 otherwise
in Raffa , obtaining a polynomial P˜a.
6. Compute the first nonzero subresultant of P˜ (t)a ,
∂ P˜(t)a
∂A(0)0
and an element τ ∈ Q at which this subresultant does not
vanish.
7. Compute Pa = P˜a/ gcd(˜Pa, ∂ P˜a
∂A(0)0
) and its partial derivatives.
8. Evaluate the variables A(0)ij for 1 ≤ i ≤ r , 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, at (−τ k)0≤k≤n−1 in the polynomial Pa and its partial derivatives
to obtain the polynomials giving the geometric resolution.
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Theorem 4. Algorithm AffineQuasiEquilibria computes a geometric resolution of the set of affine quasi-equilibria of the game
with r players having n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 pure strategies respectively and payoff matrices c(1), . . . , c(r) within complexity
O(δ8D2(D+ n1 . . . nrδ log(D)r2n5(n3 + rN))) provided that the associated set of quasi-equilibria is zero-dimensional.
Proof. Set Fa := ∏ξ∈Va F0(ξ) ∈ Q[A(0)]. For a given coefficient vector a(0), Fa(a(0)) = 0 if and only if there is ξ ∈ Va such
that F0(a(0), ξ) = 0; that is, if and only if F0(a(0)), F (1)1 (a(11)), . . . , F (r)nr (a(rnr )) have a common root in Pn1 × · · ·×Pnr . But this
is equivalent to the fact that Res(F0, F
(1)
1 , . . . , F
(r)
nr ) vanishes at a
(0), a(11), . . . , a(rnr ) or, equivalently, that Ra(a(0)) = 0. Then
Ra = Ca
∏
ξ∈Va
F0(ξ)mξ , with Ca ∈ Q, mξ ∈ N. (9)
To describe the set V affa of affine quasi-equilibria of the game, we compute R
aff
a :=
∏
ξ∈V affa F0(ξ)
mξ . Note that Raffa is monic
in the variable A(0)0...0 and
∏
ξ∈Va−V affa F0(ξ)
mξ does not depend on this variable. Then, Ca
∏
ξ∈Va−V affa F0(ξ)
mξ is the leading
coefficient of Ra in the variable A
(0)
0...0.
Consider the generic form f0 := A(0)0 x10 . . . xr0 +
∑
1≤i≤r
1≤j≤ni
A(0)ij x10 . . . xi−1 0xijxi+1 0 . . . xr0. After specializing Raffa as follows:
A(0)0...0 7→ A(0)0
A(0)0...0 j 0...0 7→ A(0)ij where the index j is in the ith place (1 ≤ j ≤ ni)
A(0)j1...jr 7→ 0 otherwise
(10)
we obtain P˜a := ∏ξ∈V affa f0(ξ)mξ . The geometric resolution of V affa can be obtained from the square-free part Pa :=∏
ξ∈V affa f0(ξ) of P˜a and the partial derivatives of Pa as shown in the proof of Theorem 1 and substituting afterwards the
powers of a conveniently chosen scalar for the variables A(0)ij .
Complexity and details of the different steps of the algorithm:
Computation of Raffa : Let t0 ∈ Q be obtained as in the proof of Lemma 3 so that Ra,t(t0) 6= 0, and let R(t0)a ∈ Q[A(0)0...0] be
the (nonzero) polynomial obtained from Ra after specializing it as in (8) for every (j1, . . . , jr) 6= (0, . . . , 0) setting t = t0.
Because of (9), deg(R(t0)a ) = da. Then, in order to compute da := degA(0)0...0(Ra), it suffices to compute the coefficients of R
(t0)
a up
to degree δ (an a priori upper bound for da). The complexity of this computation is of order O(δ2L). Now, after computing an
slp of length O(δ2L) for the coefficient of (A(0)0...0)
da of Ra, Raffa can be obtained by dividing Ra by this coefficient. As the divisor
does not vanish when its variables are specialized in the successive powers of t0, this division can be done by a classical
division avoiding algorithm within complexity O(δ4L), which produces an slp of the same order [47].
Computation of Pa: This polynomial is obtained by applying the well-known subresultant-based procedure for the
computation of the gcd of two polynomials (see, for instance, [48]).
LetG = gcd(˜Pa, ∂ P˜a
∂A(0)0
). For ξ1 6= ξ2, f (t)0 (ξ1) and f (t)0 (ξ2) are relatively prime irreducible polynomials inQ[A(0)0 , t], therefore
G(t) = ∏ξ∈V affa f (t)0 (ξ)mξ−1 = gcd(˜P (t)a , ∂ P˜(t)a∂A(0)0 ). Then, d˜a := deg(gcd(˜Pa, ∂ P˜a∂A(0)0 )) can be obtained as the degree of the gcd of
the polynomials P˜ (t)a and
∂ P˜(t)a
∂A(0)0
. To compute this degree, the algorithm looks for their first nonzero subresultant. In each step,
to decide whether the considered subresultant (which is a polynomial of degree at most 2δ2n in Q[t]) is zero or not, the
algorithm evaluates the variable t in a sufficient number of elements of Q.
First, we obtain an slp of length O(δ4L + n) for P˜ (t)a and then an slp of length O(δ2(δ4L + n)) for its coefficients in
the variable A(0)0 . For a specific evaluation of t the complexity of the computation of all the subresultants is O(δ
6L + δ2n),
and therefore, the whole complexity of this step is bounded by O(δ8Ln + δ4n2). The polynomial G˜ = sa . gcd(˜Pa, ∂ P˜a
∂A(0)0
) is
obtained as the d˜ath polynomial subresultant of P˜a and ∂ P˜a
∂A(0)0
within complexity O(δ6L) (here sa = sResd˜a (˜Pa, ∂ P˜a∂A(0)0 )). Finally,
Pa is obtained by dividing saP˜a by G˜. Note that we already know a point τ where sa does not vanish (the value obtained when
computing d˜a). Then, by evaluating the nonzero polynomial G˜(t)(A
(0)
0 , τ ) ∈ Q[A(0)0 ] of degree d˜a in at most d˜a + 1 elements
in Q, we obtain a(0)0 ∈ Q such that G˜(t)(a(0)0 , τ ) 6= 0. This enables us to compute the quotient Pa by applying the algorithm
in [47]. The complexity of this step is of order O(δ8L).
Computation of a geometric resolution: Observe that the linear form `whose coefficients are (−τ k)0≤k≤n−1 is a separating
linear form for V affa . As in the proof of Theorem1, the algorithmproceeds to compute the partial derivatives of Pa and evaluate
Pa and its derivatives at the coefficients of `. This may be done within O(δ8Ln) operations.
The overall complexity of the algorithm is O(δ8Ln+ δ4n2) = O(δ8D2(D+ n1 . . . nrδ log(D)r2n5(n3 + rN))). 
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Now, using standardmethods (see, for instance, [49,50]), we are able to give a description and to compute the cardinality
of the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of a game with zero-dimensional set of quasi-equilibria from the geometric
resolution given by Theorem 4.
Proposition 5. Following the previous notation, there is an algorithm which computes the number of totally mixed Nash
equilibria of a game with r players having n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 pure strategies respectively within complexity O(δ9D2(D +
n1 . . . nrδ log(D)r2n5(n3 + rN))) provided that the associated set of quasi-equilibria of the game is zero-dimensional.
Proof. Using Theorem 4, let p and wij (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni) be the polynomials giving the geometric resolution of
V affa . Then, the totally mixed Nash equilibria of the game are the points (ξ1, . . . , ξr) with ξi = (p′(t)/si(t), wi1(t)/si(t),
. . . , wir(t)/si(t)), where si = p′ + ∑nij=1wij for i = 1, . . . , r , and t is a root of p, having all their coordinates real and
positive. Therefore, the number of totally mixed Nash equilibria of the game equals the cardinality of the union of the sets
{t ∈ R : p(t) = 0, p′(t) > 0, wij(t) > 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni} and {t ∈ R : p(t) = 0, p′(t) < 0, wij(t) < 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤
r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni}.
Once we have p, p′ andwij ({1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni}) encoded in dense form (which can be obtained by fast interpolation
techniques as explained in [51]), by using the algorithm in [50, Section 3.3], it is possible to compute this cardinality within
complexity O(nδ3). 
Remark 6. The algorithm of Proposition 5 can be adapted to compute the list of Thom encodings of the real roots of the
polynomial p (see [52] for a definition) in the geometric resolution of the set of affine quasi-equilibria of the game leading
to totally mixed Nash equilibria within the same complexity.
4.2. Computing the isolated affine quasi-equilibria of an arbitrary game
Whenwe are dealing with an arbitrary game, it may happen that the set Va of its quasi-equilibria has positive dimension
and, therefore, the polynomial Ra introduced in the previous subsection (see the proof of Lemma 3) is identically zero.
However, the following probabilistic algorithm computes the isolated affine quasi-equilibria of the game.
Algorithm IsolatedAffineQuasiEquilibria
Input: A family of payoff matrices c(i) := (c(i)j1...jr )0≤jk≤nk for 1 ≤ i ≤ r of a game.
Output: A geometric resolution of a set including the isolated affine quasi-equilibria of the game.
Procedure:
1. Compute the resultant R of a family of multihomogeneous polynomials with multidegrees d0 = (1, . . . , 1), d(i)j =
(1, . . . , 0, . . . , 1) (where the 0 is in the ith coordinate) for 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ ni.
2. Choose a vector b := (b(ik))1≤i≤r,1≤k≤ni at random.
3. Compute a(ik)j1...ji−1ji+1...jr := c(i)j1...ji−1kji+1...jr − c(i)j1...ji−10ji+1...jr and set a for the vector with these entries.
4. Specialize A(ik) = a(ik) + u · (b(ik) − a(ik)), where u is a new variable, A(0)0...0 = A(0)0 , A(0)0...0 j 0...0 = A(0)ij , where the index j
is in the ith place, and A(0)j1...jr = 0 otherwise in R, obtaining P˜a+u(b−a).
5. Compute by interpolation the coefficients (p`(u))0≤`≤δ ∈ Q[A(0)ij ][u] of P˜a+u(b−a)(A(0)0 ).
6. For 0 ≤ ` ≤ δ, compute the coefficients (p`k)0≤k≤D of p`(u) and ` = min{k : p`k 6= 0}.
7. Compute  = min{` : 0 ≤ ` ≤ δ} and P =∑δ`=0(−1)`p`T `.
8. From the polynomial P obtain the required geometric resolution.
Theorem 7. Algorithm IsolatedAffineQuasiEquilibria is a probabilistic procedurewhich computes a geometric resolution of a finite
set of points including the isolated affine quasi-equilibria of the game with r players having n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 pure strategies
respectively and payoff matrices c(1), . . . , c(r) within complexity O(D4δ3(D+ n1 . . . nr δ log(D)r2n4(n3 + rN))).
Proof. The deformation procedure we use was applied in [26]. For the sake of completeness, we are going to explain it
briefly. We keep our previous notation.
Consider a sufficiently generic coefficient vector b := (b(ik))1≤i≤r,1≤k≤ni such that Rb 6≡ 0 (b can be either chosen at
random or effectively constructed as the coefficient vector of a system with δ many common roots). Then, if u is a new
variable, Ra+u(b−a) is a nonzero polynomial. If f (i)k is the polynomial obtained from F
(i)
k by evaluating xj0 = 1 (1 ≤ j ≤ r),
let f˜ (i)k := f (i)k (a(ik) + u(b(ik) − a(ik))) (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni). Let P˜a+u(b−a) be the polynomial obtained from Ra+u(b−a)
by specializing it as in (10) and let L := ∑i,j A(0)ij xij. Let  ∈ N0 such that P˜a+u(b−a) = u P˜ for P˜ ∈ Q[u, A(0)] with
P˜(u, A(0)) |u=0 6≡ 0 and set P := P˜ |u=0,A(0)0 =−T .
Since R is a linear combination of F0, F
(i)
k (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni), we have that P˜a+u(b−a) |A(0)0 =−L = u
 P˜ |A(0)0 =−L ∈ (˜f
(i)
k :
1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni) ∈ Q[u, xij : 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni]. Now, each irreducible component of the variety Vu defined by
G. Jeronimo et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 58 (2009) 1126–1141 1137
the ideal (˜f (i)k : 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni) in An+1 has dimension at least 1. Then, for each isolated point ξ of V affa , (0, ξ) ∈ An+1
lies in an irreducible component C of Vu such that u 6∈ I(C). Therefore P˜ |A(0)0 =−L ∈ I(C) and P |T=L vanishes at ξ . Then P is a
multiple of the minimal polynomial of L over the set of isolated points of V affa .
Note that, if P˜a+u(b−a) =∑δ`=0 p`(u)(A(0)0 )`, where p`(u) ∈ Q[A(0)ij ][u] are such that p`(u) 6≡ 0 for some 0 ≤ ` ≤ D, then
 := max{k : uk divides p` ∀ 0 ≤ ` ≤ D}.
The procedure for the computation of P from an slp encoding R runs as follows: First, a + u(b − a) is computed within
3N operations and then, the slp for R is specialized in a+u(b− a) and according to (10). IfL is the length of an slp encoding
R, an slp of length 3N + L for P˜a+u(b−a) is obtained. Then an slp encoding the coefficients p`(u) (0 ≤ ` ≤ δ) is obtained by
interpolation,which takesO(δ2(N+L)) operations. Afterwards, for every 0 ≤ ` ≤ δ, an slpwhich encodes the coefficients of
p`(u) =∑Dk=0 p`k uk is obtained, within complexity O(D2δ2(N +L)), in order to compute ` = min{k : p`k 6= 0}. To decide
whether each of the multivariate polynomials p`k ∈ Q[A(0)ij ] encoded by an slp is zero or not, we apply the probabilistic
Zippel–Schwartz zero test (see [53]). In this way,  = min{` : 0 ≤ ` ≤ δ} is computed. The overall complexity of this
step is O(D2δ3(N + L)). The last step of this procedure obtains an slp for P = ∑δ`=0(−1)`p`T ` from the slp’s encoding
p` (0 ≤ ` ≤ δ)within the same order of complexity.
Finally, from the polynomial P , the algorithmobtains a geometric resolution for a finite set of points including the isolated
points of V affa in the same way we showed in the proof of Theorem 1, except that the linear form is now taken at random,
obtaining a description for the isolated affine quasi-equilibria of the game. 
Proceeding as in the previous subsection, now it is possible to obtain an upper bound on the number of isolated (in the
complex space) totally mixed Nash equilibria of the game and the corresponding Thom encodings within the same order of
complexity as in Theorem 7.
5. A final comment on complexities
The upper bound stated in Proposition 9 in Appendix B below shows that all the algorithms presented in this paper are
polynomial in the number of strategies n1, . . . , nr of the r players, and the generic number δ of totally mixed Nash equilibria
of a game with the considered structure.
We point out that the polynomial dependence of our complexity estimates in the parameter δ is due to the use of the
multihomogeneous structure of the polynomial systems involved. This is not the case for general algorithms,which only take
into account degree bounds for the polynomials leading to complexity estimates in terms of the classical Bézout number,
which in our situation equals (r − 1)n1+···+nr . Although it is not easy to give a precise estimate of the multihomogeneous
Bézout number in terms of r and n1, . . . , nr , the following table borrowed from [27] illustrates its order of magnitude when
n1 = · · · = nr . In each box of the table, the first entry contains the multihomogeneous Bézout number and the second one
the classical Bézout number.
r ni
2 3 4 5 6
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 2 8 10 64 56 512 346 4096 2252 32768
4 9 81 297 6561 13833 531441 748521 4.3× 107 4.4× 107 3.4× 109
5 44 1024 13756 1.0× 106 6.7× 106 1.0× 109 4.0× 109 1.0× 1012 2.7× 1012 1.1× 1015
6 265 15625 925705 2.4× 108 5.7× 109 3.8× 1012 4.5× 1013 5.9× 1016 4.1× 1017 9.3× 1020
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we showed a deterministic algorithm to compute a geometric resolution of the totallymixed Nash equilibria
of a generic game in normal formwith a fixed structurewithin a complexity which is cubic in the number of these equilibria.
This complexity is due to the use of straight-line programs to encode multivariate polynomials and an efficient procedure
to compute multihomogeneous resultants.
We also presented a deterministic algorithm to compute polynomial inequality conditions on the payoff values under
which a game has the maximum possible number of this kind of equilibria.
Then, we designed symbolic deterministic procedures to describe the set of isolated totally mixed Nash equilibria of a
game and to compute their exact number provided the set of quasi-equilibria of the game is finite.
The complexity of all our algorithms is polynomial in the number of players, the number of eachplayer’s strategies and the
number of totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game with the considered structure. For generic games, the theoretical
cost of our algorithms is comparable to the one that could be obtained by applying the best probabilistic algorithms dealing
with parametric polynomial systems (see [25]).
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We expect that the techniques in [54], where the authors explain how to implement algorithms handling straight-line
programs efficiently, could be adapted to a future implementation of our algorithms. The application of these techniques
might also decrease the exponents in the complexity of the algorithms proposed to deal with specific payoff values without
introducing extra probabilistic aspects. These implementation issues and thedesign of a deterministic algorithm for arbitrary
games is the matter of future research.
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Appendix A. Computing multihomogeneous resultants
The procedure in [24] computes multihomogeneous resultants under the assumption that the coordinates of each
multidegree are all positive. As this is not the case in our setting, this subsection is devoted to showing how to adapt that
procedure.
In order to do this, we are going to use the theory in [55] and [43]. We can apply these results to our situation
because the multihomogeneous resultant of a family of multihomogeneous polynomials G0, . . . ,Gn in r groups of variables
Xj = (xj0, . . . , xjnj), with
∑r
j=1 nj = n, coincides with the sparse resultant of the dehomogenized polynomials g0, . . . , gn
obtained by setting xj0 = 1 for every 1 ≤ j ≤ r .
Let A0, . . . ,An ⊂ Zn be finite sets and let g0, . . . , gn be polynomials with supports A0, . . . ,An respectively. For any
subset J ⊆ {0, . . . , n}, let LJ be the lattice generated by ∑j∈J Aj. Following [55], if I ⊂ {0, . . . , n}, the collection of
supports {Ai}i∈I is said to be essential if rank(LI) = #I − 1 and rank(LJ) ≥ #J for each proper subset J of I . If there is a
unique subcollection {Ai}i∈I which is essential, the resultant Res(g0, . . . , gn) is not constant and coincideswith the resultant
Res(gi; i ∈ I) (see [55, Corollary 1.1]).
Proposition 8. Let n1, . . . , nr be positive integers such that ni ≤ ∑1≤k≤r,k6=i nk for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and let n :=∑
1≤i≤r ni. Then, the resultant of n+ 1 generic multihomogeneous polynomials F0, F (1)1 , . . . , F (1)n1 , . . . , F (r)1 , . . . , F (r)nr in r groups
of n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 variables respectively, where F0 has multidegree d0 = (1, . . . , 1) and, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, F (i)k are
polynomials of multidegree di = (1, . . . , 0, . . . , 1) (with 0 in the ith coordinate), is a nonconstant polynomial and can be
computed algorithmically within complexity O(D2(D+ n1 . . . nrδ log(D)r2n4(n3+ rN))), where D, δ and N are as in Theorem 1.
Proof. The resultant R will be computed recursively by applying Poisson’s formula ([43, Lemma 13]). Once this formula is
established, all the required computations run in the same way as in [24] and, therefore, the complexity of the algorithm
is of the same order. At each step, we will have to compute a multihomogeneous resultant in one of the following settings,
wherem1, . . . ,mr ∈ N andm := m1 + · · · +mr :
(I) m+ 1 multihomogeneous polynomials in r groups ofm1 + 1, . . . ,mr + 1 variables: one polynomial with multidegree
(1, . . . , 1) and, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r ,mi polynomials with multidegrees di := (1, . . . , 0, . . . , 1)with 0 in the coordinate
i, under the assumption thatmi ≤∑j6=imj for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r ,
(II) m+ 1 multihomogeneous polynomials with multidegrees (1, . . . , 1) in r groups ofm1+ 1, . . . ,mr + 1 variables each,
(III) m multihomogeneous polynomials in r groups of variables with m1,m2 + 1, . . . ,mr + 1 variables each, with mi
polynomials of multidegree di for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r , under the assumption thatmi ≤∑j6=imj for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r .
Now we are going to start with the recursion.
The polynomials F0, F
(1)
1 , . . . , F
(1)
n1 , . . . , F
(r)
1 , . . . , F
(r)
nr we start with satisfy the conditions in (I) withmi := ni andm := n.
Let us solve case (I) in general: Let G(0)0 and G
(i)
k (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ mi) be a family of polynomials satisfying the
conditions in (I) and let I := {(0, 0)} ∪ {(i, k) : 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ mi}. First, note that rank(LI) = m = #I− 1. Let J be a
proper subset of I. If there exist (i, k), (i′, k′) in J with i 6= i′, then rank(LJ) = m ≥ #J and the same holds if (0, 0) ∈ J . On
the other hand, if J ⊂ {(i, k) : 1 ≤ k ≤ mi} for a fixed i 6= 0, then rank(LJ) =∑j6=imj ≥ mi ≥ #J . Therefore, the set of all
supports is the unique essential subset. So, the resultant is not constant and the following identity holds:
Res(G(0)0 , (G
(i)
k )1≤i≤r;1≤k≤mi) =
∏
ξ∈V
g(0)0 (ξ)
∏
1≤j≤r
Res((G(i)kj )1≤i≤r,1≤k≤mi),
where g(0)0 is the dehomogenized polynomial obtained from G
(0)
0 by evaluating x`m` = 1 (1 ≤ ` ≤ r), V is the set of
common zeros in Am of the polynomials g(i)k obtained in the same way from the G
(i)
k (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ mi), and, for each
1 ≤ j ≤ r , G(i)kj is the polynomial obtained from G(i)k by setting xj mj = 0. (Note that this result, applied to the polynomials
F0, F
(1)
1 , . . . , F
(1)
n1 , . . . , F
(r)
1 , . . . , F
(r)
nr implies that the resultant Rwe want to compute is a nonconstant polynomial.)
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(I.a) If mi ≥ 2 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r , (up to renaming variables and polynomials) each of the resultants Res(G(i)kj ) involves a
family of polynomials satisfying the conditions in (III).
(I.b) Without loss of generality, assume now thatm1 = 1. Here, when computing Res((G(i)k1)1≤i≤r,1≤k≤mi)we can discard the
first group of variables. Then, the resultant involves m polynomials in r − 1 groups of m2 + 1, . . . ,mr + 1 variables
each withmi polynomials with multidegree (1, . . . , 0, . . . , 1), where the 0 is in the (i− 1)th coordinate for 2 ≤ i ≤ r ,
and one with multidegree (1, . . . , 1).
If, for every 2 ≤ i ≤ r , mi < ∑1≤j≤r, j6=imj, since m1 = 1 we deduce that mi ≤ ∑2≤j≤r, j6=imj and so, the polynomial
system obtained is of the form (I) but with one group of variables less than the original one. On the other hand, if
mi = 1 +∑2≤j≤r, j6=imj for some 2 ≤ i ≤ r , then mj < mi for every j 6= i. Therefore, the unique essential subset is
{(i, k) : 1 ≤ k ≤ mi} and the resultant to be computed is the resultant of the corresponding family of mi polynomials
of multidegree (1, . . . , 1) in r − 2 groups ofm2 + 1, . . . ,mi−1 + 1,mi+1 + 1, . . . ,mr + 1 variables each, which is the
situation in (II).
If the conditions in (II) are met, all the coordinates of the multidegrees are not zero and so, we can apply the algorithm
in [24] for the computation of the resultant.
To analyze (III), let us consider first the case when r = 2. Here, the assumption on the numbers mi implies that
m1 = m2 := M .
(III.a) We consider the resultant ofM polynomials with multidegrees (0, 1) andM polynomials with multidegrees (1, 0) in
two groups of M and M + 1 variables respectively. Now the unique essential set is the corresponding to the first M
polynomials and, therefore, as they are linear forms, the resultant equals the determinant of their coefficient matrix.
Assume now that r > 2. Note that the equality mi = ∑j6=imj may be valid for at most one value i. If, on the contrary,
mi1 =
∑
j6=i1 mj andmi2 =
∑
j6=i2 mj hold for i1 6= i2, it follows that
∑
j6=i1,i2 mj = 0, which implies r = 2. Let G(i)k (1 ≤ i ≤ r,
1 ≤ k ≤ mi) be a family of polynomials satisfying the conditions in (III).
(III.b) Ifm1 = 1, we are under the same assumptions as in (I.b).
(III.c) Ifm1 ≥ 2 andmi =∑j6=imj for some 2 ≤ i ≤ r , the set {(i, k) : 1 ≤ k ≤ mi} is the unique essential subset. Then, the
resultant involves mi polynomials of multidegrees (1, . . . , 1) in r − 1 groups of m1,m2 + 1, . . . ,mi−1 + 1,mi+1 +
1 . . . ,mr + 1 variables respectively and we are in situation (II).
(III.d) If m1 ≥ 2 and mi < ∑j6=imj for every 2 ≤ i ≤ r , then mi ≤ m1 − 1 +∑j6=1,imj for every 2 ≤ i ≤ r . Therefore, the
unique essential subset is the whole family of supports and applying Poisson’s formula we obtain:
Res((G(i)k )1≤i≤r;1≤k≤mi) =
∏
ξ∈W
g(1)1 (ξ)
∏
2≤l≤r
Res((G(1)kl )2≤k≤m1; (G(i)kl )2≤i≤r,1≤k≤mi),
where g(1)1 is the dehomogenized of G
(1)
1 by setting xjmj = 1 for every 1 ≤ j ≤ r , W is the set of common zeros in
Am−1 of the polynomials g(1)k (2 ≤ k ≤ m1), g(i)k (2 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ mi) obtained in the same way from the G(i)k , and
G(i)kl is the polynomial obtained from G
(i)
k by setting xl ml = 0.
For l = 2, . . . , r , setting m′ := m − 1, m′1 := m1 − 1 and m′i := mi for i 6= 1, the resultant to be computed involves
m′ polynomials in r groups ofm′1+ 1, . . . ,m′l−1+ 1,m′l,m′l+1+ 1, . . . ,m′r + 1 variables each withm′i polynomials of
multidegree di for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r . We have m′1 ≤
∑
j6=1m
′
j and, for i 6= 1, the condition mi <
∑
j6=imj implies that
m′i ≤
∑
j6=im
′
j; therefore, renaming variables and polynomials, we are again under the assumptions of (III). 
Appendix B. A bound for the degree of the resultant
As before, we assume n = n1 + · · · + nr with ni ∈ N for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r . We consider the resultant R of a fam-
ily of n + 1 multilinear polynomials in r groups of n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 variables each, consisting of a polynomial F0 of
multidegree d0 := (1, . . . , 1) and, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r , a set of ni polynomials F (i)k (1 ≤ k ≤ ni) of multidegree di :=
(1, . . . , 1, 0, 1, . . . , 1), where the 0 lies in the ith coordinate. Denoting
δi := Bezn1,...,nr (d0, 1; d1, n1; . . . ; di, ni − 1; . . . ; dr , nr), i = 1, . . . , r,
the resultant R is a multihomogeneous polynomial in the coefficients of F0, F
(i)
k of degree δ in the coefficients of F0 and δi
in the coefficients of F (i)k for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni (see, for instance, [56]). Therefore, the total degree of R equals
D = δ +∑1≤i≤r niδi.
Proposition 9. Following the previous notations, D ≤
(
1+∑1≤i≤r ni(ni + 1))δ ≤ n2δ.
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Proof. Let us prove that δi ≤ (ni+ 1)δ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r . Without loss of generality, suppose i = 1. As the Bézout number
is additive in each of the multidegrees involved (see identity (1)) and d0 = d1 + e1, where e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), we have
δ1 = Bezn1,...,nr (d1, n1; d2, n2; . . . ; dr , nr)+ Bezn1,...,nr (e1, 1; d1, n1 − 1; d2, n2; . . . ; dr , nr)
= δ + Bezn1,...,nr (e1, 1; d1, n1 − 1; d2, n2; . . . ; dr , nr).
Now, identity (1) implies that Bezn1,...,nr (e1, 1; d1, n1 − 1; d2, n2; . . . ; dr , nr) = #J1, where
J1 = {(j11, . . . , jrnr )/j11 = 1, jik 6= i∀ (i, k) 6= (1, 1) and #{jhk / jhk = i} = ni ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r}.
In order to finish the proof, we will show that #J1 ≤ n1δ. Since δ equals the cardinality of the set J0 introduced in (2), we
will compare the cardinalities of both sets J1 and J0. To this end, we define the following map from J1 to J0: with a given
n-tuple j := (1, j12, . . . , j1n1 , . . . , jr1, . . . , jrnr ) ∈ J1 we associate the n-tuple j′ ∈ J0 which is obtained by exchanging the
first coordinate of j (which equals 1) with the first one which is different from 1 and is located beyond the n1th coordinate.
Note that a necessary condition for two distinct n-tuples in J1 to lead to the same n-tuple in J0 by means of this assignment
is that they coincide in all of their coordinates except for two of them located among the n1 coordinates n1 + 1, . . . , 2n1.
Moreover, the vector consisting of these n1 coordinates must be of the form (1, . . . , 1, jhk, . . .) for both of them (possibly
with no 1 at the beginning) and so, they can only differ in the length of the string of 1’s in this vector, which ranges between
0 and n1 − 1. We conclude that each element of J0 is the image of at most n1 elements of J1. It follows that #J1 ≤ n1#J0 as
we wanted to prove. 
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